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SYMPOSIUM
THE (RE)TURN TO HISTORY IN RELIGION
CLAUSE LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP
INTRODUCTION
Lee J Strang*
One of the leading treatises on constitutional law, John Nowak
and Ronald Rotunda's Constitutional Law, no doubt spoke for many
when it noted the "seemingly irresistible impulse to appeal to history
when analyzing issues under the religion clauses."1 This Symposium
focuses on that "impulse."
In this Introduction, I offer a brief review of and explanation for
the role history has played in the Supreme Court's religion clause ju-
risprudence and scholarly efforts. History's role is powerful in the Es-
tablishment Clause context, which I will discuss first. In stark contrast,
history played almost no role in the Free Exercise Clause context until
1990, in response to the (in)famous Employment Division v. Smith.2
Thereafter, I will discuss the contributions of the Symposium partici-
© Lee J. Strang. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. I would like to thank my
loving wife Elizabeth for her sacrifice to allow me to write this Introduction. I would
also like to thank Richard Myers and Steve Safranek for their helpful comments, Rick
Garnett for organizing this Symposium, and Bryce Poole and Jonathan Greenberg for
their research assistance.
1 JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONS7TITUTIONAL LAW § 17.2, at 1411
(7th ed. 2004). For Nowak and Rotunda, however, "[t]his tendency is unfortunate
because there is no clear history as to the meaning of the clauses." Id.
2 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not re-
quire states to grant exemptions to general, neutrally applicable laws that burden
religious exercise).
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pants which better our understanding of the proper role of history in,
and the historical background of, the religion clauses.
I. THE ORIGINALIST RETURN TO HISTORY
In order for there to be a "(Re)turn" to history, there must first
be a "turn" to history, and this occurred in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion,3 the Court's first modern application of the Establishment
Clause. In Everson, the Court purported to delve into the "back-
ground and environment" of the adoption of the Establishment
Clause to ascertain its meaning. 4 The Court, through Justice Black,
reviewed the religious history of the settlement of the United States5
and especially that of newly-independent Virginia,6 and concluded
that the Establishment Clause incorporated the views of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson. 7 While the Everson Court's historical
claims have received strong criticism, the Court's first modem case
applying the Establishment Clause built its argument on historical
claims, thereby setting the groundwork for future appeals to history.
The Court's next establishment case, McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion,8 continued its historical elaboration of the meaning of the Estab-
lishment Clause and included a long debate about the historical
merits (or lack thereof) of Everson's separationist principle.9 The
McCollum Court ruled that an Illinois school district's voluntary, in-
school, release-time religious education program violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.10 Justice Frankfurter, concurring, reviewed the his-
tory of education in the United States, especially that of public schools
and release-time religious education, and concluded that the separa-
tion "of the State from the teaching of religion"'" was a "presupposi-
tion of our Constitutional system." 12 Justice Reed, in dissent, reviewed
the historical practices of governmental accommodation of religion in
3 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Prior to Everson, the Supreme Court (and commentators)
had rarely addressed the history of the religion clauses. See Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 162-66 (1878) (containing the Court's only substantial discussion of the
history of the religion clauses prior to Everson).
4 330 U.S. at 8.
5 Id. at 8-11.
6 Id. at 11-14.
7 Id. at 13; see also id. at 16 ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause against estab-
lishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church
and State."' (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164)).
8 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
9 Id. at 212-31 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 238-41 (Reed,J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 210 (majority opinion).
11 Id. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12 Id. at 220.
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educational contexts to argue that the Establishment Clause did not
bar the school district's program.
1 3
After McCollum, the Court's discussions of the historical back-
ground of the Establishment Clause lessened in frequency and depth
until, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court's opinions were
nearly devoid of historical analysis and consisted instead of arguments
from precedent and policy. In fact, after McCollum in 1948 and prior
to Marsh v. Chambers1 4 in 1983, the Court's substantive historical dis-
cussions generally occurred only when the Court was faced with a rela-
tively novel issue. 1 5 For example, there is little discussion of history in
Zorach v. Clauson1 6 in 1952 which addressed a variation on the release-
time religious education issue decided earlier in McCollum,17 while in
McGowan v. Maryland'8 and Engel v. Vitale,19 decided in 1961 and 1962
respectively, the Court engaged in moderately extended discussions of
the historical practices of Sunday closing laws and official prayers,
both relatively novel issues not directly addressed by the Court's
precedent.
20
13 Id. at 238-40 (Reed, J., dissenting).
14 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska state legislature's practice
of opening sessions with a prayer).
15 One exception is Justice Brennan's concurrence in School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 230-304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring), which broadly ranged
through history and precedent to reach a synthesis of what the Establishment Clause
means.
16 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding a school district's program of releasing
students, upon parental request, to participate in religious instruction conducted off
school grounds but during school hours).
17 See also Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (relying on precedent to rule that
recitation of passages from the Bible or the Our Father violated the Establishment
Clause). Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968), relied on analogy to Ever-
son, McCollum, Engel, and Schempp to rule that an Arkansas statute, which forbade the
teaching of evolution, violated the Establishment Clause. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39, 40-42 (1980) (per curiam), analogized the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schools to the activities struck down in Schempp and Engel
18 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961) ("[I]nquiry into the history of Sunday Closing Laws in
our country ... is relevant to the decision ,. ").
19 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) ("It is a matter of history that this very practice of
establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the
reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious
freedom in America.").
20 See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (recounting the history
of the Constitution's prohibition of denominational preferences); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681-85 (1970) (reviewing the history of tax exemptions for
religious bodies); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 490-92, 494-95 (1961) (reviewing
the history of test oaths).
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By the late 1960s and early 1970s, history's only appearance was
generally as rhetorical window dressing for substantive conclusions
which were already arrived at through other means. For example, Jus-
tice Douglas argued at length in his dissent in Board of Education v.
Allen 2' over the harm caused by "public funds.., being poured into
sectarian schools," 22 which he supported with a brief quote from
James Madison at the very end of his opinion. 23
The turn away from history by the Court during this period is
likely explainable in large measure by the central role of precedent in
our legal practice. 24 Traditionally, once a court decides the meaning
of the law in a case, that case becomes an authoritative legal material
that courts in later analogous cases are, absent unusual circumstances,
obliged to follow. 25 Later courts will not repeatedly return to and dis-
cuss the foundations of the initial case. Instead, the issue is settled by
the initial case and discussion of its foundations is therefore closed.
As noted by the Court in Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist,26 " [t] he history of the Establishment Clause has been
recounted frequently and need not be repeated here."27
Many of the establishment cases that faced the Court in the late
1960s and 1970s involved governmental assistance to religious schools,
which the Court decided on the basis of earlier decisions. Conse-
quently, the Court did not engage in repeated returns to the historical
foundations of Everson. For instance, in Board of Education v. Allen,28
the Court upheld a state textbook loan program by analogy to Everson
21 392 U.S. 236, 266 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 266 n.18.
23 Id. at 266. ("'Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any
particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the sup-
port of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment
in all cases whatsoever?'" (quoting 2 THE WITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1901))).
24 For discussions on the role stare decisis plays in our legal practice, see gener-
ally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). See also LeeJ. Strang, An Originalist
Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing stare decisis and the role it plays in American
legal practice).
25 See cases cited infra note 29.
26 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
27 Id. at 770.
28 392 U.S. 236.
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and Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education.29 Similarly, in Lemon
v. Kurtzman3" the Court struck down state private school aid statutes
and created the (in)famous Lemon test on the basis of its precedent.
3 1
Moreover, during this period a working majority of Justices sub-
scribed to Everson's separationist principle and were therefore not in-
clined to challenge the historical basis of Everson and instead were
content to apply precedent to new situations as they arose. Justices
White and Rehnquist were the only Justices who consistendy voted to
affirm the constitutionality of the governmental accommodations of
religion at issue, with Chief Justice Burger generally aligning with
them. 3 2 However, prior to the return to history I discuss below, even
29 See id. at 241-47 (majority opinion) (discussing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947), and Cochran v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930)); see
also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977) ("The mode of analysis for Estab-
lishment Clause questions is defined by the three-part test that has emerged from the
Court's decisions."); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754 (1976) (conclud-
ing, after extensively discussing the Court's precedent, that "the slate we write on is
anything but clean" and that the Court's "purpose" is to "merely ... insure that [the
principles governing public aid to religious schools] are faithfully applied in this
case"); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-49 (1973) (upholding a state bond statute
on the basis of precedent); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-88 (1971) (up-
holding a federal program that provided funds to religious colleges and universities
for construction of academic buildings).
30 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
31 Id. at 612-24; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975) (relying on
the Lemon test which was an "accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past
decades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action challenged as violative" of
the Establishment Clause); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828 (1973) ("Because we
find no constitutionally significant difference between [the legislation at issue in
Nyquist and the legislation at issue here], that decision compels our affirmance of the
District Court's decision here."); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 770-89 (relying on what the
Court's precedent held as "firmly established" to strike down a state aid statute that
provided aid to nonpublic schools); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479-81 (1973) (striking down state statutes that provided aid to
nonpublic schools by relying on Everson, Lemon, and Nyquist).
32 During the late 1960s and 1970s, Justice White voted to affirm the governmen-
tal accommodation of religion at issue in the following cases: Wolman, Roemer, Meek,
Sloan, Hunt, Nyquist, Levitt, Lemon, Walz, Allen. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
255 (1977); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 770 (1976); Meek, 421 U.S. at
396; Sloan, 413 U.S. at 820; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 820; Hunt, 413 U.S. at 749; Levitt, 413
U.S. at 482; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 665; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970);
Allen, 392 U.S. at 238. Justice Rehnquist voted with Justice White, after he came on
the Court in 1972, in every case except Levitt, his first Establishment Clause case while
on the Court. See Levitt, 413 U.S. at 482. ChiefJustice Burger voted withJustice White
in Wolman, Roemer, Meek, Sloan, Hunt, Nyquist, and Walz. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255;
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 766-67; Meek, 421 U.S. at 385; Sloan, 413 U.S. at 798; Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 798; Hunt, 413 U.S. at 749; Walz, 397 U.S. at 680. Burger voted against the
20061
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Justices White and Rehnquist did not rely on history to support their
arguments so much as analysis of precedent.
33
Scholarly examination of the history behind the Establishment
Clause-and whether the Supreme Court's "official" version of the
history was accurate-occurred throughout this period, but it ebbed
and flowed in rough correlation to the use of history in the Court's
opinions (and to the occurrence of the Court's opinions themselves).
For instance, the number of scholarly books and articles on the sub-
ject dramatically increased during the period when the Court decided
Torcaso, McGowan, Engel, and Schempp (between 1962-1965) .3 4 And
governmental accommodations of religion at issue in Levitt and Lemon. See Levitt, 413
U.S. at 482; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
33 The lack of arguments based on history by Justices White and Rehnquist prior
to the originalist movement discussed below could have resulted from the intellectual
climate which was hostile to originalism and/or a pragmatic calculation on the part of
the Justices that originalist arguments were not, as a practical matter, going to suc-
ceed on the Court at that time.
34 See, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU ET. AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISH-
MENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
(1964); CHURCH AND STATE UNDER GOD (Albert G. Huegli ed., 1964); DAVID FELLMAN,
RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW (1965); PAUL A. FREUND & ROBERT ULICH, RELIC-
ION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1965); MARX DEWOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
(1965); WILBUR G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1964); PAUL G.
KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); J. MARCELLUS KIK, CHURCH AND
STATE (1963); MARTIN A. LARSON, CHURCH WEALTH AND BUSINESS INCOME (1965);
FRANKLIN H. LITTELL, FROM STATE CHURCH TO PLURALISM: A PROTESTANT INTERPRETA-
TION OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1962); WILLIAM H. MARNELL, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1964); ANSON PHELPS
STOKEs & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1964); THE
SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE (Joseph Tussman, ed. 1962); ARTHUR E. SUTH-
ERLAND, THE CHURCH SHALL BE FREE (1965); THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
(Dallin H. Oaks ed., 1963); Allen C. Brownfield, The Constitutional Intent Concerning
Matters of Church and State, 5 WM. & MARY L. REv. 174 (1964); Paul M. Butler & Alfred
L. Scanlan, Wall of Separation-Judicial Gloss on the First Amendment, 37 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 288 (1962); Edmond Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1274 (1961); Edmond Cahn, On Government and Prayer, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 981
(1962); Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Estab-
lishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 65 (1962); Philip
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); Leo
Pfeffer, Religion-Blind Government, 15 STAN. L. REv. 389 (1963) (reviewing PHILIP B.
KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1962)); Jeffrey Dean Stone, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in the
Public Schools, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 73 (1963).
The other phase of major scholarly activity, not surprisingly, was during the pe-
riod of Everson, McCollum, and Zorach (between 1948-1953) See, e.g.,JOSEPH L. BLAU,
CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1949); R. FREEMAN BUTTs, THE
AMERICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION (1950); MARK DEWOLFE HOWE,
[VOL. 81: 51702
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the number of scholarly works was relatively low between the Court's
decisions in Zorach and Torcaso, and again after 1965. Scholarly dis-
cussion of the history behind the Establishment Clause remained rela-
tively low throughout the 1970s.
The return to history in religion clause law and scholarship-
especially in the Establishment Clause context-is, I believe, a mani-
festation of the rise of originalism that occurred in the late 197 0s and
early 1980s. 35 In response to the perceived excesses of the Warren
Court era, a reevaluation of constitutional interpretative methodolo-
gies occurred. The first prominent salvo was an article by then law
professor Robert Bork, published in 1971.36 Then came Raoul
Berger's 1977 Government by Judiciary3 7 When Ronald Reagan took
CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1952); ALVIN W. JOHNSON &
FRANK H. YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1948);J. M.
O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949); WILFRID
PARSONS, S.J., THE FIRST FREEDOM: CONSIDERATIONS ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1948); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953); ANSON
PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950); WILLIAM GEORGE
ToRPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA (1948); Irving Brant,
Madison: On the Separation of Church and State, 8 WM. & MARY Q. (3D SERIES) 3 (1951);
ROBERT FAIRCHILD CUSHMAN, Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitu-
tional Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 333 (1950); Charles Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Su-
preme Court, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1949); Wilber G. Katz, Freedom of Religion
and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426 (1953); Milton R. Konvitz, Separation of
Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 44 (1949); Conrad
Henry Moehlmann, The Wall of Separation: The Law and the Facts, 38 A.B.A. J. 281
(1952); John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23
(1949); James M. O'Neill, Nonpreferential Aid to Religion Is Not an Establishment of Relig-
ion, 2 BUFF. L. REv. 242 (1953); Leo Pfeffer, Church and State: Something Less Than
Separation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1951); Leo Pfeffer, No Law Respecting an Establishment
of Religion, 2 BUFF. L. REv. 225 (1953); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Due Process and Dises-
tablishment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1306 (1949); T. Raber Taylor, Equal Protection of Religion:
Today's Public School Problem, 38 A.B.A.J. 277 (1952); Edward F. Waite, Jefferson's "Wall
of Separation".- What and Where?, 33 MINN. L. REV. 494 (1949).
35 For a thorough discussion of the history of originalism, see JOHNATHAN
O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (2005). See also RANDY E.
BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 89-100 (2004) (describing the death,
transformation, and resurrection of originalism); DENNISJ. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 20-54 (2005) (discussing the politi-
cal motivations behind and goals of the rise of originalism); Steven K. Green, "Bad
History": The Lure of Histo7y in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REx'.
1717, 1736-37 (2006) (discussing briefly the turn to originalism); Keith E. Whitting-
ton, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 599-612 (2004) (discussing the
political motivations behind and goals of the rise of originalism).
36 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971).
37 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
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office, originalism found a political advocate, and the Reagan Justice
Department under Attorney General Edwin Meese began a concerted
effort to advance originalism. 38 One of the fruits of this effort was a
return to history in the Establishment Clause context.
Prominent originalists, both within and without the Administra-
tion, filed briefs39 at all levels of the litigation in Wallace v. Jaffree.40
Then Justice Rehnquist, one of the Court's earliest explicit propo-
nents of originalism, 4I wrote a dissenting opinion in Jaffree42 that re-
38 See O'NEILL, supra note 35, at 134-60 (discussing the relationship between
originalism and the Reagan Administration).
39 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
alsoJaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1113 n.5 (S.D. Ala.) ("At the
start the Court should acknowledge its indebtedness to several constitutional scholars.
If this opinion will accomplish its intent, which is to take us back to our original
historical roots, then much of the credit for the vision lies with Professor James Mc-
Clellan and Professor Robert L. Cord. Their work and the historical sources cited in
their work have proven invaluable to the Court in this opinion."), affd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The appellee
[State of Alabama] and the district court rely heavily on the research of historians.
These historians believe the Supreme Court misread the history surrounding the es-
tablishment clause. They submit that the establishment clause has a dual purpose (1)
to guarantee the people of this country that the federal govenment will not impose a
national religion, and (2) to guarantee states the right to define the meaning of relig-
ious establishment under their state constitutions and laws."), affd, 472 U.S. 38;
O'NEILL, supra note 35, at 149-51 (discussing the concerted effort to change the
Court's Establishment Clause interpretation in Wallace).
40 472 U.S. 38. The Court's opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983),
delved deeply into the history of legislative prayer two years prior to Rehnquist's dis-
sent in Jaffree. However, Marsh's use of history was not the coherently originalist use
of history found first in Rehnquist's dissent and in many subsequent opinions by the
Justices. Instead, the Marsh Court, focusing solely on legislative prayer, argued that it
was "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country" and is "part of the
fabric of our society." Id. at 786-92. Without explanation, the history of legislative
prayer was viewed as a carve-out of the Court's previous precedent. Id. at 795. It was
not part of an overarching originalist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
The difference between Marsh and Rehnquist's dissent was recognized by both
Justices O'Connor and White in Jaffree, although they had different reactions.
O'Connor noted that Rehnquist "suggest[ed] that a long line of this Court's decisions
are inconsistent with the intent of the drafters of the Bill of Rights," but found that
since the history was inconclusive, the Court must "employ both history and reason."
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 79, 80 (O'Connor, J., concurring). White, by contrast, "appreci-
ate[d] Justice Rehnquist's explication of the history of the Religion Clauses" and
thought "it would be quite understandable if we undertook to reassess our cases deal-
ing with these Clauses, particularly those dealing with the Establishment Clause." Id.
at 91 (White, J., dissenting).
41 William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 704
(1976) ("The brief writer's version of the living Constitution, in the last analysis, is a
formula for an end run around popular government.").
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lied on the originalist arguments presented to the Court.43 Rehnquist
argued that the "true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only
be seen in its history" and that "the Framers inscribed the principles
that control today. '4 4 He further argued that the Court should aban-
don the historically inaccurate Everson "wall" metaphor.
45
Recent scholarly work had strongly challenged the Court's histor-
ical claims that undergirded its separationist holdings, most promi-
nent among them Robert Cord's Separation of Church and State.
46
Rehnquist's opinion was an extended discussion of the history of the
Establishment Clause building on that recent scholarship. 47 Rehn-
quist's dissent was, unlike cases decided in the previous twenty years, a
return to the historical foundations of the Court's establishment juris-
prudence and an explicit calling-into-question of that precedent.
Rehnquist's dissent became a starting point for future originalist argu-
ments on and off the Court regarding the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause.4 The change in modes of argumentation in
the Court's opinions from the 1970s, and since Rehnquist's dissent in
Jaffree, is striking.
The originalist return to history in the Establishment Clause con-
text has continued on the Court to the present. In the Court's recent
Ten Commandments decisions, for instance, the Justices debated the
historical origins and the impact (or lack thereof) of that history on
the questions facing the Court. In McCreaiy County v. ACLU,49 Justice
42 472 U.S. at 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43 O'NEILL, supra note 35, at 150-51.
44 Jafftee, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 107.
46 ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, at xiv (1982) ("In this
book, with the use of mostly primary historical documents, I show conclusively that
the United States Supreme Court has erred in its interpretation of the First Amend-
ment."). Cord's book was cited by both Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist in Jaffree.
Jafftee, 472 U.S. at 79 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 104 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
47 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 91-113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2876 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("Strong arguments to the contrary have been raised from time to time, perhaps
the strongest in then Justice Rehnquist's scholarly dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree." (em-
phasis omitted)); John S. Baker, Jr., The Establishment Clause as Intended: No Preference
Among Sects and Pluralism in a Large Commercial Republic, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGI-
NAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 41 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed., 1991)
(relying extensively on Rehnquist's dissent); Richard S. Myers, The Establishment Clause
and Nativity Scenes: A Reassessment of Lynch v. Donnelly, 77 Ky. LJ. 61, 99 (1989) (pro-
posing a view of the Establishment Clause "in [the] long tradition ... [including]
now-Chief Justice Rehnquist").
49 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
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Souter delivered the Court's opinion, which relied primarily on prece-
dent to reach its conclusion, but he also engaged with Justice Scalia's
explicitly originalist dissent by arguing that Scalia was wrong as an his-
torical matter °5 0 that the original meaning is indeterminate, 51 and
that originalism is unworkable in any event.5 2 Justice O'Connor,
though she did not directly engage Scalia, argued that the Court has
been "guid[ed]" by the Framers' principle of religious liberty, which,
because of changed circumstances, the Court would apply in unfore-
seen ways. 53 Lastly, Justice Scalia, in dissent, engaged the majority,
Justice O'Connor, and Justice Stevens' dissent in Van Orden v. Perry,
54
and argued that the original meaning of the Establishment Clause was
authoritative, and that it permitted public display of the Ten
Commandments.55
The continuing appeal of (and to) history has been aided by the
appointment of Justices Scalia and Thomas, two prominent and vocal
originalists who complimented Rehnquist, and occasionally O'Connor
and Justice Kennedy.56 As in other areas of the Court's jurisprudence,
those Justices who might not otherwise be disposed to discuss the orig-
inal meaning of the Constitution are required to respond to the
originalist arguments put forward by the originalistJustices (especially
in the establishment context). This occurred in the Van Orden and
McCreary County cases where nonoriginalistJustices, such as Justice Ste-
vens, 57 engaged in extended historical argument.
Partly in response to then Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Jaffree,
the history of the Establishment Clause also received renewed atten-
tion by scholars. For instance, Leonard Levy published The Establish-
ment Clause in 1986 in which he labeled Rehnquist's history "fiction."
58
The scholarly attention to the historical background of the Establish-
50 Id. at 2742-44.
51 Id. at 2744 ("The fair inference is that there was no common understanding
about the limits of the establishment prohibition."). For discussions of legal indeter-
minacy, see, e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989); Lawrence
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462
(1987); Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48 (2005).
52 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2745.
53 Id. at 2746-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54 125 S. Ct. 2854.
55 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2748-57 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
56 There is no indication, as of yet, whether the recently confirmed justices, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, will be strongly originalist.
57 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2882-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAusE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 155 (1986); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FAm-
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ment Clause has continued unabated to the present, as the scholars
participating in this Symposium exemplify.
59
II. THE Too-LATE(?) RETURN TO HISTORY
In comparison to the often determinative role history has played
in the Establishment Clause context, history had no discernable im-
pact on the Supreme Court's free exercise case law prior to Smith, and
similarly, there was little scholarly focus on the historical origins of the
Free Exercise Clause during this period.
The initial-albeit limited-turn to history in the Court's free ex-
ercise jurisprudence occurred in its first Free Exercise Clause cases. 60
In Reynolds v. United States,61 the Court upheld application of a federal
criminal bigamy statute to a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints. 62 Reynolds argued that application of the statute to
him would violate his right to free exercise because Mormonism re-
quired him to take more than one wife "and that the penalty for such
failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come.
'6 3
The Reynolds Court engaged in a brief survey of the history of
religious freedom contemporaneous to Ratification (less than three
pages in the U.S. Reports) 64 and concluded that "Congress was de-
prived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to
reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order."65 The Court then-again briefly-reviewed the history
of legal prohibitions against polygamy at common law and in the
United States contemporaneous with Ratification, and thereafter.
66
Given this unbroken history of legal prohibition, the Court concluded
that "it is impossible" to find that the Free Exercise Clause prevented
Congress from proscribing polygamy.6
7
ERS' CONSTITUTION 174-94 (1988) (discussing the history of the Establishment
Clause); LEONARD W. LEW, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 79-102 (1999) (same).
59 See, e.g., DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMASJEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-
STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005); PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
60 In Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1890), the Court also briefly refer-
enced the history of the Free Exercise Clause and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
61 98 U.S. 145.
62 Id. at 166-67.
63 Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 Id. at 162-64.
65 Id. at 164.
66 Id. at 164-65.
67 Id. at 165.
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After this brief, initial flirtation, the Court turned from history.
The Court's first modern free exercise case was Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut.68 The Court in Cantwell did not address history and instead of-
fered policy arguments why protection of religious activities, but not
unlimited protection, was necessary in the United States, "a people
composed of many races and of many creeds.
'69
The absence of history in Cantwell continued in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,70 where the Court established the "compelling interest test" for
free exercise exemption cases.7 1 The Court began its opinion with a
discussion of the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, which was deter-
mined exclusively by precedent.7 2 And the Court simply cited to
NAACP v. Button73 to support its conclusion that South Carolina must
support its burden on Sherbert's religious exercise with a compelling
state interest.
7 4
The absence of history continued after Sherbert.7 5 As Justice Sou-
ter has noted: "Save in a handful of passing remarks, the Court has
not explored the history of the [Free Exercise] Clause since its early
attempts in 1879 and 1890."76 The Court's case law until after Smith
consisted of analyses of free exercise precedent and policy claims.77
68 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
69 Id. at 310.
70 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
71 Id. at 406.
72 Id. at 402-03.
73 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
74 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing the discussion of the compelling state interest
test in Button, 371 U.S. at 438).
75 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1413 (1990) ("The Court made no effort in
Sherbert or subsequent cases to support its holdings through evidence of the historical
understanding of 'free exercise of religion' at the time of the framing and ratification
of the first amendment."); see also Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions
and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 247-48 (1991) (pointing out
the lack of discussion of historical meaning in the Court's free exercise
jurisprudence).
76 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 574
(1993) (Souter,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-66 (1878), and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,
342 (1890)); see also McConnell, supra note 75, at 1413 ("Yet neither Sherbert nor any
other Supreme Court opinion-majority, concurring, or dissenting-has ever
grounded the interpretation of the free exercise clause in its historical meaning.").
77 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (1990) (stating that for most of the twentieth century the
Court's Free Exercise Clause doctrine was settled and scholars "were content to work
out the implications of the doctrine rather than to challenge it at its roots").
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For instance, in Wisconsin v. Yoder 78-perhaps the high point of free
exercise exemptions-Chief Justice Burger's opinion found that the
Amish defendants were entitled to a free exercise exemption from
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law through application of
precedent to the facts of the case. 79 Discussion of the history of the
Clause was absent.
During most of this period, legal scholars were concerned prima-
rily with analyzing the Court's precedent.80 However, a few scholars
did discuss the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. 81 But
their impact on the Court was negligible, at least if one takes the
Court's opinions at face value, which litigants and scholars did.
8 2
A number of factors, I believe, contributed to the marked dispar-
ity in the role of history between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. The most important factor was the relative favor that
religiously-based, constitutionally-mandated free exercise exemptions
received across political and religious lines.8 3 Most Americans agreed
that free exercise exemptions were good policy and hence there was
no strong motivation to critique the Court's jurisprudence. As then
78 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
79 Id. at 213-21, 230-34.
80 See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1414 ("[L]ittle or no scholarly work has been
devoted primarily to the history of the concept of 'free exercise of religion.'").
81 See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 1-32 (1976) (discussing the Founders' interpretation of religious free-
dom); MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 19-37 (1978) (providing some of the historical context of
the Free Exercise Clause); Arlin M. Adams & CharlesJ. Emmerich, A Heritage of Relig-
ious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559, 1625-34 (1989) (arguing that one of the original
animating principles of the religion clauses was accommodation of religious exer-
cise); Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 839, 843-60 (1986) (providing a generic history of the religion clauses);
William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemp-
tion, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357, 375-79 (1989) (arguing that free exercise exemp-
tions are not historically rooted); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion,
1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 14-24 (proposing that the Court interpret the religion clauses
to promote religious liberty based, in part, on the original political theory of the Con-
stitution); Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante),
76 CEO. L.J. 1691, 1695-99 (1988) (arguing that governmental accommodation of
religious exercise within otherwise neutral and generally applicable laws is not sup-
ported by the original meaning of the Constitution).
82 This is shown, for example, by the briefs submitted to the Court in Smith,
which noticeably lacked any historical challenge to the compelling interest test.
83 This remarkable consensus was displayed in the hostile reaction to Smith's re-
pudiation of free exercise exemptions. See Bradley, supra note 75, at 246 (listing
many of the strange bedfellows who opposed Smith); see also McConnell, supra note
77, at 1111 (noting that Smith was opposed by "an unusually broadbased coalition").
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Professor McConnell noted: "The great debates over the relation of
religion to government in our pluralistic republic ... almost without
exception were issues of establishment. Government support for re-
ligion, not government interference with religion, was the issue.
'8 4
This was especially the case when compared to the strong motivation
religious conservatives had to challenge the Court's historically-based
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
5
As discussed above in Part I, the move toward originalism was
strongly supported in the Reagan Adminstration's Department of Jus-
tice. 86 Originalists such as Attorney General Meese had the ambitious
overarching goal of creating a 'jurisprudence of Original Intention
'87
along with many specific goals, including changes to the Court's sepa-
rationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.88 Much lower on
the list of sought-after changes was alteration of the Court's exemp-
tion interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.8 9 With finite time and
resources, originalists concentrated their fire on what they saw as the
84 McConnell, supra note 77, at 1109.
85 See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1413 (noting the disparity between the role of
history in the two clauses).
86 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
87 Edwin Meese III, U.S Attorney Gen., Address Before the American Bar Associa-
tion (July 9, 1985), in MAJOR POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL 1, 7
(1989).
88 O'NEILL, supra note 35, at 149-51 (discussing the concerted effort to change
the Court's Establishment Clause interpretation in Wallace).
89 See Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 409, 409 (1986) (noting that "[p]olitically active fundamentalists" supported by
the Reagan Administration have attacked the Court's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence without noting a corresponding attack on the Court's free exercise
jurisprudence).
The Reagan Administration's Justice Department issued a report detailing the
Department's view on the correct interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATToRNEY GENERAL: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE (1986). The report concluded that a proper interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause permits governmental regulation of religious exercise "when
government action is necessary to prevent manifest danger to the existence of the
state; to protect public peace, safety, and order; or to secure the religious liberty of
others." Id. at v. The report characterized these governmental interests as "compel-
ling." Id.; see also id. at 57 (explaining that the state's burden is to "prove its regulation
is the least restrictive means necessary to further a compelling state interest"). As a
result, the official Reagan Justice Department interpretation of the Free Exercise




most egregious nonoriginalist errors in areas such as abortion and
criminal procedure.90
A second reason for the lack of historical analysis in Free Exercise
Clause cases is that court-granted free exercise exemptions did not
have a large practical impact. This is true for a number of reasons.
First, legislatures (on all levels) often provided for exemptions, either
for altruistic or other reasons, and hence there was little need for
courts to impose constitutional exemptions. 91 Second, given the polit-
ical clout of mainstream religions, legislatures would only refuse to
grant an exemption and burden religious exercise of minority reli-
gions whose adherents did not have the influence to motivate substan-
tial criticism. Third, there were relatively few cases granting free
exercise exemptions. Lastly, most of the United States has been rela-
tively religiously homogeneous and most Americans' religious beliefs
have been in accord with most acts of their elected branches.9 2 As a
result, no great need for religious exemptions ever arose.
A third reason why the Sherbert test was not challenged historically
is the simple historical accident that the Court's modern free exercise
jurisprudence was not premised on historical claims, as was its Estab-
lishment Clause interpretation.93 In other words, the Court's fixation
on history in the Establishment Clause context was the anomaly, and
its lack of history in the free exercise context was the norm.9 4 These
different treatments of history persisted until Smith.
The return to history by both the Court and scholars occurred, in
large measure, as a backlash against Employment Division v. Smith.
95
90 See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATroRNEY GENERAL: ORIGINAL MEAN-
INGJURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 64-71 (1987). Section IV, titled "Cases Illustrating
Non-Interpretive Jurisprudence," lists several examples of nonorginalist cases and
does not include any free exercise cases. Id.
91 See William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political Actors in Accommodation of Religion,
22 U. HAw. L. REv. 403, 437-43 (2000) (arguing that the political process is very
adept at providing accommodations for religious exercise by members of minority
religions); see a/soJesse H. Choper, Comments on Stephen Carter's Lecture, 87 CAL. L. REv.
1087, 1089-90 (1999) (gathering examples of legislative accommodation).
92 For statistics regarding America's religious beliefs, see GRADUATE CTR. OF THE
CITY UNIv. OF N.Y., AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY, available at http://
www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research-studies/aris.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2006).
93 See David Reiss, Jefferson and Madison as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Relig-
ion Clause Jurisprudence, 61 MD. L. REv. 94, 114 (2002) ("[T]hrough wholesale accept-
ance and adoption of justice Waite's history in Reynolds, Black establishes a canonical
Supreme Court history-a history which is more and more difficult to erase the more
it is repeated.").
94 See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1413 (noting the anomaly).
95 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Smith was the immensely controversial decision 96 that (re)interpreted
the Court's free exercise jurisprudence to rule that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require an exemption from neutral laws of general
applicability.97 None of the parties in Smith asked the Court to
reevaluate its case law, and the opinion does not discuss the Court's
motivation for its reevaluation. Justice Scalia, the Court's most promi-
nent originalist, 98 wrote the Court's opinion but surprisingly99 offered
only two brief references to either the text or history of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 100 Instead, the bulk of the opinion was concerned with
96 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 75, at 248 (supporting Smith by asserting that the
fixation on religious exemptions is the result of liberal individualism with its emphasis
on privatized religion); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemp-
tion: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992) ("In fact, late
eighteenth-century Americans tended to assume that the Free Exercise Clause did not
provide a constitutional right of religious exemption from civil laws."); Douglas W.
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, 59
UMKC L. REV. 591, 592 (1991) ("Any, even unintended, prohibition of religious activ-
ity must be justified by its government proponents." (citation omitted)); Ira C. Lupu,
The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 743-46 (1992) (arguing
against religious accommodation); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 713-41 (1992)
(reviewing arguments concerning constitutional religious exemptions); McConnell,
supra note 77 (criticizing Smith as both historically and philosophically wrong);
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 117 (1992) (arguing that the religion clauses
should be read together to promote religious freedom); Jane Rutherford, Religion,
Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 303, 315-19, 332-45
(2001) (criticizing Smith and offering an alternative rationale for religious freedom);
Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of Consci-
entious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367, 370-72 (1994) (arguing that
the Free Exercise Clause's original meaning supports the result in Smith); John Witte,
Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 420 (1996) (criticizing Smith by arguing that Smith fails to
recognize the four principles contained in the Free Exercise Clause).
97 Smith, 494 U.S. at 866 n.3 ("Our conclusion [is] that generally applicable, relig-
ion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest .... ).
98 See, e.g., ANTONIN ScALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
99 See McConnell, supra note 77, at 1117 ("This is particularly surprising because
the author of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia, has been one of the Court's fore-
most exponents of the view that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of its
original meaning.").
100 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (discussing permissible interpretations of the text of
the Free Exercise Clause); id. at 885 (arguing that the compelling interest test contra-
dicts our "constitutional tradition").
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distinguishing the Court's precedent 1°' and arguing that a pluralistic
society such as our own "cannot afford the luxury of deeming pre-
sumptively invalid... every regulation of conduct that does not pro-
tect an interest of the highest order."
10 2
Following Smith, both the Court and scholars dramatically re-
turned to history. Members of the Court immediately questioned the
historical validity of Smith's holding. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,l03Justice Souter urged the Court to reexam-
ine Smith in light of historical scholarship showing that Smith was
wrongly decided.1 0 4 And more recently in City of Boerne v. Flores,
10 5
Justices Scalia and O'Connor engaged in a discussion over whether
Smith was historically sound.10 6
The scholarly discussion of the history behind the Free Exercise
Clause began immediately after Smith and continues. l07 Scholars have
come to divergent conclusions on whether Smith is correct as an his-
torical matter' 08
III. (RE)TURN TO HISTORY IN RELIGION CLAUSE
LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP
Many of the questions that have animated the debate surround-
ing the Establishment Clause over the past sixty years, on and off the
Court, remain with us today: What is the proper role of the historical
background of the Clause? What does that history show regarding the
meaning of the Clause? Other issues are relatively new, or have re-
ceived renewed interest as of late. These include the constitutionality
of the Pledge of Allegiance and of governmental displays of the Ten
Commandments, the "federalism" or 'jurisdictional" interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, and the historical relevance of the Blaine
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence also briefly addressed the text and history
of the Free Exercise Clause, primarily by appealing to the Clause's purported histori-
cal purpose. Id. at 901-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). The bulk of her argument was spent analyzing precedent and making
policy arguments.
101 Id. at 878-85 (majority opinion).
102 Id. at 888 (emphasis omitted).
103 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
104 Id. at 574-77 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
105 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
106 Id. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); id. at 548-64 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
107 See sources cited supra note 96 (listing articles discussing the original meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause).
108 See sources cited supra note 96 (listing articles discussing the original meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause).
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Amendments to the meaning of the Clause. The scholars in this Sym-
posium address many of these issues.
The scholars who participated in the American Association of
Law Schools panel discussion on the (Re)Turn to History in Religion
Clause Law and Scholarship, whose work is published in this Symposium
issue of the Notre Dame Law Review,10 9 all addressed aspects of history
in the Establishment Clause context. Given the often critical role his-
tory has played in that context, the focus of the participants is not
surprising.
Professor Green's contribution directly addresses the role of his-
tory and its continuing relevance. 110 First, Green briefly reviews his-
tory's role in Establishment Clause law and scholarship and the
changing proponents of that role over time." a While those Green
labels "separationists" initially used history to bolster the Everson ac-
count of the origins of the Establishment Clause, today "the Court's
'accomodationists[ ]' [are] now enjoying the fruits of the tree of his-
tory." 112 Green recounts this shift 13 and then critiques over-reliance
on history by lawyers seeking to provide determinate answers to cur-
rent questions.1 14 Lastly, he critiques four specific, relatively recent
uses of history: originalism in the Establishment Clause context gener-
ally; the history surrounding the Blaine Amendments; the Ten Com-
mandments and Pledge of Allegiance cases; and Justice Thomas's
"federalism" interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
115
Like Green, Professor Laycock begins his article by questioning
the uses to which history has been put in supporting "modern agen-
das" in religion clause litigation. 1 6 However, the primary focus of
Laycock's contribution is his argument that-contrary to claims by
some scholars-there is virtually no historical evidence that the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits regulatory exemptions of religious exer-
cise. 11 7 Laycock describes the history of exemptions for religious
conduct beginning in the period of established churches. In those
states with established churches, the members of the churches did not
109 Symposium, The (Re)Turn to History in Religion Clause Law and Scholarship, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1697 (2006).
110 See Green, supra note 35.
111 Id. at 1717-19.
112 Id. at 1719.
113 Id. at 1720-28.
114 Id. at 1728-34.
115 Id. at 1734-53.
116 See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1793, 1793-94 (2006).
117 Id. at 1837-40.
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need religious exemptions, and by the time of the Founding, non-
members had achieved many legislative exemptions.'18 Next, Laycock
reviews the history of exemptions during the Founding period, both
legislative and judicial, and concludes that there is "almost no evi-
dence of anyone arguing that exemptions established religion."
1 19
And Laycock finds that no scholars have "seriously argued that regula-
tory exemptions were forbidden." 120 Lastly, Laycock argues that the
origin of the exemption-equals-establishment argument is recent, not
grounded in history, and is instead the result of misapplication of the
principle of governmental neutrality. 1
21
Professor Smith, in his contribution, clarifies the 'jurisdictional
interpretation" of the Establishment Clause and explains why he finds
that interpretation persuasive. 122 The jurisdictional interpretation
posits that the Establishment Clause did not embody a particular the-
ory of religious freedom and instead reconfirmed the pre-constitu-
tional jurisdictional arrangement: "religion was a subject within the
domain of the states, not the national government."1 23 Smith argues
that the jurisdictional interpretation best explains the historical evi-
dence of, for example, the near-complete lack of debate over ratifica-
tion of the Establishment Clause and the lack of a popular consensus
on the necessity of disestablishment. 124 Thereafter Smith responds to
criticisms of the jurisdictional interpretation. 125 His conclusion is that
the jurisdictional interpretation, properly understood, is the best ex-
planation for the historical meaning of the Establishment Clause, and
that much of the resistance to the interpretation is the result of policy
disagreements over the possible effects of the jurisdictional interpreta-
tion, not its historical accuracy.'
26
Professor Hamilton provides a "religious history of the Establish-
ment Clause." 127 After reviewing the unique religious background of
the United States and the Establishment Clause, Hamilton argues that
different denominations contributed distinct principles to the mean-
118 Id. at 1808-10.
119 Id. at 1825.
120 Id. at 1830 (emphasis omitted).
121 Id. at 1827-33.
122 See Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1843, 1845 (2006).
123 Id. at 1843.
124 Id. at 1845-63.
125 Id. at 1863-91.
126 Id. at 1891-93.
127 See Marci A. Hamilton & Rachel Steamer, The Religious Origins of Disestablish-
ment Principles, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1755, 1756 (2006).
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ing of the Clause.128 According to Hamilton, it was through the pro-
cess of disestablishing state establishments that "religious leaders and
their theologies ... [developed] the principles of disestablishment
that compose the doctrine today."1 29 The Calvinists, both Congrega-
tionalists and Presbyterians, contributed the principle of functional
separation and nonpreferentialism. i30 The Baptists contributed the
principle of the right to believe according to one's own conscience.' 3 '
The Quakers contributed the noncoercion principle. 32 And perhaps
most controversially, Roman Catholics contributed to the understand-
ing that "the separation of church and state in the United States re-
quires intolerance of theocratic beliefs and conduct." 133
CONCLUSION
In this Introduction, I offered a brief review of and explanation
for the role history has played in the Supreme Court's religion clause
jurisprudence and scholarly efforts. We have seen that history's role is
powerful in the Establishment Clause context, while history played al-
most no role in the Free Exercise Clause context until Employment Di-
vision v. Smith.'34 I suggested a number of explanations for the appeal
of history, with the most prominent being the turn toward originalism
that occurred on the Court and in the academy in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. The strong role of history in religion clause scholarship
continues today through the contributions of the Symposium partici-
pants. With the debate over history's role and its content showing no
signs of abating-spurred in large measure by the broader debate
over constitutional interpretation-we can expect history to continue
to play a central role.
128 Id. at 1759-67.
129 Id. at 1767.
130 Id. at 1767-73.
131 Id. at 1773-76.
132 Id. at 1776-80.
133 Id. at 1788; 1780-88.
134 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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